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Means: Real Property

REAL PROPERTY
DAVID

H. MEANs*

Transmissibilityof ContingentRemainders
Jones v. Holland,1 the sble future interest case decided during the survey period, deals with the always vexing problem
of whether or not a requirement that a remainderman or an
executory devisee survive until some period subsequent to
the testator's death is to be implied from the existence of some
other condition precedent annexed to the interest of such remainderman or executory devisee. For example, A devises
Blackacre to B for life, remainder in fee to the children of B
who shall survive him, but if B dies leaving no children him
surviving, remainder in fee to C. During B's life the interests
of B's children and of C are contingent remainders, 2 the interests of B's children being subject to the condition precedent
that they survive B and the interest of C being subject to the
expressed condition precedent that B die unsurvived by children. As regards C's interest, is a further condition precedent
that C survive B to be implied, so that if during B's life C dies
intestate, C's heir will not be entitled to possession of Blackacre upon B's subsequent death without surviving children?
The proper answer to this question would seem to be that
the interest of C not expressly being subject to the requirement
that he survive B, no such requirement is to be implied, and,
therefore, that C's heir is entitled.3
However, suppose that in the above illustration the alternative contingent remainder is to C's children instead of to C,
so that the devise reads to B for life, remainder in fee to B's
children who shall survive him, but if B dies leaving no children him surviving remainder in fee to C's children. At the
testator's death C is alive and has three living children, C-1,
C-2, and C-3. Thereafter C-1 predeceases B, who subsequently
*Associate Professor of Law, University of South Carolina.
1. 223 S.C. 500, 77 S.E. 2d 202 (1953).
2. Faber v. Police, 10 S.C. 376 (1878).

2 Tiffany, REAL PROPERTY
§ 321, 333 (3rd ed. 1939).
3. Dickson v. Dickson, 23 S.C. 216 (1885); Black v. Todd, 121 S.C.
243, 113 S.E. 793 (1922). Simes, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FUTURE
INTERESTS 275 (1951); 5 AmERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 21.25 (1952).
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dies without children living at his death. Do C's then living
children, C-2 and C-8, each take a one-half interest in Blackacre, or is the estate of C-1 also entitled? In other words, although there is no implied requirement of survival where
the remainder is to an individual devisee, is such a requirement to be implied when the remainder is to a class?
Although the authorities in general agree that where a
remainder to a class is vested a member of the class need
not survive the life tenant,4 where the remainder is on a contingency other than survivorship of the life tenant there is far
less accord. The American Law Institute5 and certain text
writers have taken the position that the same rule applicable to a contingent remainder to an individual should be
applied where the remainder is to a class, and, therefore, that
in the above illustration the interest of C-3 is transmissible.
The cases,7 however, are far from uniform in support of C-3.
In Jones v. Holland8 the devise was "to my grandson, Johnnie... during the lifetime of the said Johnnie and at his death
to go to his children in fee simple, and in case he ...has no
children to revert back to my estate and be equally divided
among my grandchildren .... ." The testator was survived
by seven grandchildren, only one of whom survived the life
tenant, who died without ever having had a child. In a con4. Crossby v. Smith, 3 Rich. Eq. 244 (1851); Bannister v. Bull, 16 S.C.
220 (1881). 2 Simes, FUTURE INTERESTS § 390 (1936); 5 AMERICAN LAW
OF PROPERTY § 21.11 (1952).
5. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY

§ 261 (1940). Comment a. thus rational-

izes the Institute's position:
"The fact that a limitation contains language creating one condition
precedent as to a remainder or executory interest, is in no way helpful
in deciding whether other language in the same limitation creates another condition precedent based upon a separate and unrelated future
occurrence. Similarly, the existence of one defeasibility affords no help,
in determining the existence of another defeasibility. The rule stated
in this Section would be almost too obvious for statement if it were not
for the erroneous view, often expressed in cases concerning class gifts,
that the members of the class necessarily remain subject to the condition precedent of survival so long as the ultimate ascertainment of the
class is postponed by another defeasibility or condition precedent of
such gift...."
6. 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 21.25 (1952); Simes, HAmnRoox
OF THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS 275, 301 (1951).
However, cf. 2
Simes, FUTURE INTERESTS § 391 (1936).
7. The leading cases to the effect that a class member must survive
until the time of the vesting of the contingent remainder to the class
are Drury v. Drury, 271 Ill. 336, 111 N.E. 140 (1915), and In re Coots
Estate, 253 Mich. 208, 234 N.W. 141 (1931), cert. dev. sub nom. Delbridge v. Oldfield, 284 U.S. 665 (1931). For other cases see 5 AMERICAN
LAW oF PROPERTY § 21.25 (1952), note 3, and 2 Simes, FUTURE INTERESTS
§ 391 (1936).
8. See note 1, supra.
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test between the heirs of the deceased grandchildren and the
surviving grandchild the Court held that the contingent interests9 of the grandchildren were nontransmissible, and, therefore, that the surviving grandchild took the entire property.
While several of the South Carolina cases10 referred to in
the opinion of the Court seem readily distinguishable because
of the presence in the limitations construed in those cases of
an expressed requirement of survival, one case, Jeffords v.
Thornal,"' appears squarely to support the conclusion of the
Court. One other cited case, Black v. Todd, 2 needs further
comment. There the devise in substance was to B for life, remainder in fee to the children of B who shall survive her, but
-if B dies leaving no children her surviving, then to C for life,
remainder in fee to her children. C outlived the testatrix but
died in B's lifetime, survived by two children. These children
also predeceased B, who then died without surviving children.
It was held that the contingent interest of C's children were
not defeated by their failure to survive B, apparently on the
theory that the death of the parent having ended the possibility of any further increase in the class membership, the interests of then living class members had become transmissible
just as though these members had been individually designated.
It does not appear in Jones v. Holland 3 (as it did not in the
Jeffords case' 4 ) whether or not a similar impossibility of an
increase in the class membership had occurred prior to the
termination of the life estate. If in these cases such impossibility of an increase in the class membership could have been
established, in view of Black v. Todd' 5 it appears that the
interest of all then living class members would at that time
become transmissible. Thus in Jones v. Holland,1 assuming
9. The circuit judge had ruled that the grandchildren took a vested

remainder subject to being divested by the birth of a child to the life

tenant. The Supreme Court held the interests of the grandchildren to
be contingent remainders, a conclusion which seems inescapable in view
of the authorities cited in the opinion.
10. Roundtree v. Roundtree, 26 S.C. 450, 2 S.E. 474 (1887); In re
Warren's Will, 176 S.C. 455, 180 S.E. 458 (1935) ; Dukes v. Shuler, 185
S.C. 303, 194 S.E. 817 (1938). Dickson v. Dickson, 23 S.C. 216 (1885),

also cited by the Court, involved a contingent remainder to an individual
rather than one to a class.
11. 204 S.C. 257, 29 S.E. 2d 116 (1944).
12. 121 S.C. 243, 113 S.E. 793 (1922).
13. See note 1, supra.
14. See note 11, supra.

15. See note 12, supra.
16. See note 1, supra.
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that all the testator's children predeceased the life tenant, it
would seem that all grandchildren living at the death of the
last child had transmissible interests which did not require
their surviving the life tenant. Whether or not this factual
situation existed is not apparent from the opinion in the
case.
Adverse Possession
While an unexplained exclusive possession of land by a
stranger to the title ordinarily will be presumed to be adverse, 17 the existence of certain legal relations between the
adverse claimant and the true owner rebuts such presumption
of hostility. Two such problems were considered during the
period of the survey.
In Watson v. Little' s the Court affirmed the position taken
in previous cases' 9 that adverse possession by a tenant in common against his cotenants does not commence to run until
there has been an ouster of the cotenants by the tenant in possession. While such an ouster may be presumed from an exclusive enjoyment of the property for twenty years, no such
presumption will arise from a mere exclusive enjoyment for a
shorter period, and where the claimant's occupancy has been
for less than twenty years, proof of'an actual ouster of which
the cotenants out of possession knew or in the exercise of
reasonable diligence should have known is necessary. In the
instant case the claimant could not establish adverse possession because his exclusive occupancy having been for less than
twenty years, no ouster could be presumed. The Court found
it unnecessary to decide whether the taking and recording of a
tax deed by one tenant amounts to an ouster of his cotenants,
since less than ten years had elapsed since the execution of the
deed.
In Knight v. Hilton" the Court applied the settled rule21
that adverse possession by a mortgagee against the mortgagor
does not commence to run until there has been a distinct dis17. Knotts v. Joiner, 217 S.C. 99, 59 S.E. 2d 850 (1950); Knight v.
Hilton, 224 S.C. 452,79 S.E. 2d 871 (1954).
18. 224 S.C. 359, 79 S.E. 2d 384 (1953).
19. Among the many S. C. cases to this effect see Gray v. Givens,
2 Hill Eq. 511, Riley Eq. 41; Weston v. Morgan, 162 S.C. 177, 160 S.E.
436 (1931); Wells v. Coursey, 197 S.C. 483, 15 S.E. 2d 752 (1941);
Knotts v. Joiner, 217 S.C. 99, 59 S.E. 2d 850 (1950).
20. 224 S.C. 452, 79 S.E. 2d 871 (1954).
21. Frady v. Ivester, 129 S.C. 536, 125 S.E. 134 (1924); Ham v.
Flowers, 214 S.C. 212, 51 S.E. 2d 753, 7 A.L.R. 2d 1124 (1949); Fogle v.
Void, 223 S.C. 83, 74 S.E. 2d 358 (1953).
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avowal and repudiation of the mortgage relationship and
notice thereof brought home to the mortgagor. The plea of

adverse possession was held to fail because there was no evidence of the adverse character of the mortgagee's possession.
Problems Incident to Real EstateSubdivisions
The rule that owners of lots in a subdivision have a special

property interest in areas designated on the subdivision plat
as streets or parks which interest is not affected by a failure

of the public to acquire rights therein because of an incomplete dedication was applied in Newton v. Batson.22 The Court

held proper an order enjoining a nonconforming use granted
against a purchaser with notice of a lot designated as a park
on the subdivision plat.
Where changed conditions have made impossible the accomplishment of the purpose of restrictive covenants imposed upon

the lots in a subdivision, the enforcement of such covenants

may be denied in equity. 23 What constitutes such a change in

the character of the neighborhood as to destroy the effect of
the covenants is a question on which the cases are not in

accord. Some courts have taken the position that if a change in
the character of the area outside the subdivision makes im-

possible the enjoyment of border lots in the subdivision in
accordance with the purpose of the restrictions, then there

is sufficient change of condition to warrant a refusal to enforce the restrictions against the border lots.2 4 Other courts
have enforced the covenants against the owners of border
22. 223 S.C. 545, 77 S.E. 2d 212 (1953). Prior cases include Billings
v. McDaniel, 217 S.C. 261, 60 S.E. 2d 592 (1950); Cason v. Gibson, 217
S.C. 500, 61 S.E. 2d 58 (1950); Outlaw v. Moise, 222 S.C. 24, 71 S.E.
2d 509 (1952).
23. See Pitts v. Brown, 215 S.C. 122, 133, 54 S.E. 2d 538 (1949),
Martin v. Cantrell, 81 S.E. 2d 37, 40 (S.C. 1954). 2 AmERICAN LAW oF
PROPERTY § 9.39 (1952). It has been held in a few cases that even
though a nonconforming use of a restricted lot will not be enjoined because of changed conditions, the lot owner cannot maintain an affirmative action to quiet title against the restrictive covenant since the agreement is still enforceable in an action at law. Strong v. Shatto, 45 Cal.
App. 29, 187 Pac. 159 (1919), and other cases cited in 5 AMERICAN LAW
OF PROPERTY § 9.39 (1952), p. 445, note 3. Other cases have held that
such affirmative relief may be granted. Hess v. Country Club Park,
213 Cal. 613, 2 P. 2d 782 (1931), and other cases cited in 5 AMERICAN
LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.39 (1952), p. 445, notes 1, 2. See notes 88 A.L.R.
405 (1934), 103 A.L.R. 734 (1936). The opinion of the Court in Martin
v. Cantrell, 81 S.E. 2d 34 (S.C. 1954), expresses no doubt as to the
propriety of such affirmative relief by way of a declaratory judgment.
24. Downs v. Kroeger, 200 Cal. 743, 254 Pac. 1101 (1927); Clark v.
Vaughan, 131 Kan. 438, 292 Pac. 783 (1930). 5 AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY § 9.39 (1952).

Published by Scholar Commons, 1954

5

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 1 [1954], Art. 21
SOUTu CAROLINA LAW QUARTERLY
[Vol. 7

lots on the theory that such lots are designed as buffers for
the protection of interior lots, and that unless the change in
conditions has taken place within the subdivision, or if outside
the subdivision is so extensive as to affect the 25
entire subdivision, the covenants have not lost their validity.
In Martin v. Cantrell2 6 the Court affirmed the refusal by
the circuit judge of a declaratory judgment that certain residential restrictive covenants were no longer enforceable because of changed conditions. The record in the case was held
to show no radical changes in the surrounding area, and no
changes within the subdivision which would make inequitable
the enforcement of the covenants. The authorities cited by the
Court are to the effect that a change of conditions outside the
restricted area does not affect the validity of the restrictions.
MunicipalLiability for Injuries to PrivatePropertyFrom
Surface Water
A neat question of statutory construction, one well illustrative of the difficulties of proper legislative draftsmanship,
2
was presented the Court in Hill v. City of Greenville. 7
A statute28 provides "Whenever within the boundaries of
any municipality, it shall be necessary or desirable to carry
off the surface water from any street ...

over

. . .

private

lands.., upon demand from the owner... thereof ... such
municipality shall provide sufficient drainage for such water
through . . , drains except where the formation of the street
renders it impracticable, along ... such streets . .. in such
manner as to prevent the passage of such water over such
private lands ... provided ... if such drains cannot be had
along.., such streets.., the municipal authorities shall have
the power [of] condemnation ... on payment of damages to
the landowner ....

If any municipal corporation

. . .

fail or

refuse to carry out the provisions of this section, any person
injured thereby may... maintain an action against such municipality for.., actual damages .... "
25. Continental Oil Co. v. Fennemore, 38 Ariz. 277, 299 Pac. 132
(1931), and other cases cited in 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.39
1952), note 11. See notes 54 A.L.R. 812 (1928), 85 A.L.R. 985 (1933),
103 A.L.R. 734 (1936).
26. 81 S.E. 2d 37 (S.C. 1954).
27. 223 S.C. 392, 76 S.E. 2d 294 (1953).
28. § 7301, S. C. CODE OF LAWs (1942), enacted in 1902 (23 STAT.
1038). The text of the statute as contained in § 59-224, CODE OF LAWS
OF S. C., 1952? is somewhat altered. For judicial comment upon this
textual alteration, see Holliday v. City of Greenville, 224 S.C. 207, 215,
78 S.E. 2d 279 (1953).
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Does the statute impose an affirmative duty to protect private lands adjoining the street, or does it impose liability
only in the event some positive action by the municipality has
occasioned the injury? Contrary to the construction placed
on the statute by the circuit judge, the Court found the statute
applicable only where the municipality had acted to alter existing drainage, and, therefore, that the City of Greenville
was not liable to a landowner for the continuance of the drainage system created by the State Highway Department prior to
the annexation of the area to the city.
A later case, Holliday v. City of Greenville,2 9 further clarified the meaning of the statute by affirming judgment on a
verdict for the plaintiff where the damage resulted from the
city's alteration of existing drainage by the installation of
curbs and gutters. The Court pointed out that since the action
was brought under the statute quoted above it was unnecessary to consider whether the city might not also be liable on
the theory of the taking of private property for public use
without compensation.
Adjudication of Title in Trespass Quare Clausum Fregit
In Little v. Little3" the Court had occasion to consider the
effect, in an action of trespass quare clausum fregit, of a denial by defendant of plaintiff's right to possession by reason
of a plea of liberum tenementum (that the locus in quo is defendant's freehold, or that of a third person under whom he
acted31 ). In line with earlier South Carolina cases cited in the
opinion it was held that while possession and not title normally is involved in trespass quare clausum fregit, yet where
the defendant denies plaintiff's title and pleads liberum tenementum, the judgment on a verdict is conclusive between the
parties on the issue of title. Here the judgment on a verdict
for the plaintiff was held determinative of the location of a
disputed boundary since under the pleading and proof such
verdict necessarily was an adjudication in plaintiff's favor of
the boundary location.
Reformation and Cancellationof Deeds
In a suit by the grantors against a purchaser from their
grantee for a reformation of the description in a deed on the
29. Holliday v. City of Greenville, 224&S.C. 207, 78 S.E. 2d 279 (1953).

30. 223 S.C. 332, 75 S.E. 2d 871 (1953).
a1. BLACK'S LAw DIcTioNARY 1066 (4 ed. 1951).
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ground of mutual mistake, the Court applied the principle
that even if there were a mutual mistake (of which the court
found insufficient evidence) which would warrant a reformation between the parties to the deed, such reformation cannot
for value without
be had as against a subsequent purchaser
32
notice of the equity of reformation.
Where more than six years after discovery of the facts suit
was brought for the cancellation of certain deeds alleged to
be forgeries, the Court held the action to be barred by the
six year statute of limitations for relief on the ground of
fraud.83
Boundaries
Sellers34

the Court was concerned with an
In Rushing v.
unusual application of the general rule that in a conveyance
of land calling for a highway as a boundary it is presumed
that the grantor intended a conveyance to the center of the
highway. Where the description in a deed calls for a conveyance out of a larger tract of one acre of land situate in the
fork of the junction of two highways, does the grantee take
one acre free of the area subject to the highway easements,
or is the land to the center of each of the two highways to be
included in the calculation of the one acre conveyed? Answering this question, the Court held that the parties must be
presumed to have intended the conveyance of one acre suitable
for private use, and, therefore, that the computation of the
one acre area must be made from the edge rather than from
the center of each of the two highways. However, despite
this method of computing the land conveyed, the fee to the
centers of the highways passed to the grantee, so that upon
an abandonment of one of the highways by the public authorities the grantee's successor was held entitled to possession to
the center of the abandoned highway as against the assignee
of the balance of the tract.

32. Ives v. Ives, 223 S.C. 461, 76 S.E. 2d 471 (1953).
33. McKinnon v. Summers, 224 S.C. 331, 79 S.E. 2d 146 (1953).
34. 81 S.E. 2d 281 (S.C. 1954).
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